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Abstract
This paper investigates how environmental taxes affect manufacturing productivity by ex-
amining British Columbia’s revenue-neutral carbon tax. I develop a new hypothesis, the “Pro-
ductivity Dividend Hypothesis,” to show that environmental taxes can positively affect pro-
ductivity by recycling tax revenues to reduce corporate income taxes. This revenue-recycling
increases investment and could raise productivity more than environmental taxes lower pro-
ductivity by diverting resources from production. I evaluate this hypothesis using detailed
confidential plant-level data. I find that the carbon tax lowers productivity, although this is
offset to some extent by the revenue-recycling. For some plants, the policy generates a net
gain in productivity.
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1. Introduction
Implementing environmental policy is a challenging task. Environmental benefits are difficult
to quantify and may come at the cost of economic growth and jobs although this is uncertain.
Among various policy instruments available, environmental taxes have recently gained popularity,
especially in Europe, due to its ability to raise revenues.1 Such revenues are sometimes used to
reduce the existing distortionary taxes, thereby stimulating economic growth. In the wake of the
Paris Agreement, many more jurisdictions are considering some types of carbon pricing policy to
reduce emissions. Policymakers then face a challenge in deciding how to use the revenues. To
guide policymakers on this issue, this paper investigates how environmental taxes affect manu-
facturing productivity when the tax revenues are recycled. I answer this important question by
examining the revenue-neutral carbon tax implemented by British Columbia in 2008.
Investigating the productivity effect on the manufacturing sector is important for three reasons.
First, the manufacturing sector is still one of the largest sectors in the economy around the world.2
Second, the manufacturing sector plays an essential role in future innovation because its R&D
expenditure is large, and technological advancements in manufacturing positively affect the rest
of the economy. Third, policymakers and the public worry that manufacturing firms would suffer
greatly from additional costs imposed by the carbon tax because the manufacturing sector is both
emission-intensive and trade-exposed.
British Columbia (BC) implemented a carbon tax on July 1st, 2008, applying it to the purchase
of all fossil fuels for all consumers. It is the first and most comprehensive carbon pricing policy
in North America. The policy provides unique features that one can take advantage of to clearly
identify the productivity effect of the policy. First, the policy was implemented only five months
after its announcement. This surprise and quick implementation gave no room for polluting plants
to adjust their operations to minimize the tax burden prior to the implementation. Second, the
tax rate was set at a relatively high rate, which provided strong incentives for plants to adjust
operations to reduce their emissions. Third and most importantly, all of the tax revenue raised
was returned back to the economy to keep the government revenue constant, i.e., a revenue-neutral
policy. The revenues were used to reduce personal and corporate income taxes and provide lump-
sum transfers to low-income households. In this paper, I particularly focus on the importance of
this revenue-recycling via the reduction of corporate income taxes on productivity.
My empirical strategy is motivated by a simple model of the total factor productivity (TFP)
1See Bosquet (2000) for the list of European countries with different types of environmental taxes.
2For example in BC, manufacturing sector comprises 10 percent of the provincial GDP, and it is a major contributor
to exports. In terms of jobs, 20 percent of jobs are in the manufacturing sector and their wages are 15 percent higher
than the provincial average (Heartwell, 2012). In addition, 30 percent of the national GDP in China is from the
manufacturing sector (see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?locations=CN).
1
residual. By incorporating abatement investment decisions into the model, I develop a new hypoth-
esis to show that environmental taxes can positively affect productivity by recycling tax revenues to
reduce corporate income taxes (CIT). The model shows that there are two distinct channels through
which a revenue-neutral carbon tax affects the plant’s productivity. First, the model predicts that
taxing energy purchases diverts some productive resources away from production to regulatory
compliance, lowering productivity. At the same time, it could induce more investment in abate-
ment, enhancing productivity. The productivity effect of this “carbon tax effect” is determined by
these two channels.
Second, recycling revenues from the carbon tax to lower the rate of the CIT positively affects
productivity. This comes from the fact that this “revenue-recycling effect” ameliorates the distor-
tionary nature of the CIT system, increasing the productivity-enhancing investments.
When this revenue-recycling effect raises productivity more than the carbon tax lowers produc-
tivity by diverting resources from production, a revenue-neutral carbon tax can lead to a net gain in
productivity. I name this hypothesis the “Productivity Dividend Hypothesis” (PDH). Furthermore,
if the revenue-neutral carbon tax also reduces emissions, it offers a double dividend. I name this
the “Productivity Double Dividend (PDD) Hypothesis.”
I evaluate the PDH using a unique detailed confidential plant-level data containing longitudi-
nal information on the corporate income tax and manufacturing production. This detailed data
allows me to separately identify the carbon tax and revenue-recycling effects on productivity. I
identify both effects, not only by comparing plants in BC with plants in the rest of Canada (ROC)
before and after the implementation of the carbon tax, but also by comparing plants based on plant
characteristics that are directly related to each effect.
The carbon tax effect is estimated using the plant-level carbon tax expenditure intensity. Us-
ing the data on the fuel-specific energy expenditure, I calculated how much each plant paid for
the carbon tax relative to its value-added. If high carbon tax expenditure intensive plants in BC
experience a larger decline in productivity relative to low carbon tax expenditure intensive plants
in BC, this productivity decline can be interpreted as the effect of the carbon tax. The revenue-
recycling effect is estimated using the data on taxable income. I compare plants whose parent firm
is in a loss position with plants whose parent firm is making a positive profit. If the latter plants
experience a larger increase in productivity relative to the former plants, this productivity increase
can be interpreted as the effect of revenue-recycling. This is because a reduction of the CIT rate is
irrelevant for plants whose parent firm is in a loss position.
Using this strategy, the productivity effect is estimated by a propensity-score-weighted (PSW)
difference-in-differences (DID) estimator, allowing for different treatment intensity across plants.
This method augments the conventional DID estimator by allowing the treatment to be continu-
ous and constructing estimates for the counterfactual from the ROC plants that resemble the BC
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plants. I first estimate the propensity scores using a rich set of observable pre-treatment plant char-
acteristics, such as energy expenditures by various fuel types. I then use these propensity scores
as weights to re-weight the distributions of the control plants in the estimation so that the plants
from BC and ROC are similar in the pre-treatment period. Larger weights are given to plants that
are more similar to plants in BC. In addition, I exploit the panel structure of the data by including
various fixed effects to control for possible unobserved confounding factors, such as commodity
price shocks, provincial geographic characteristics, and plant-specific managerial ability.
Using this approach, I find that BC’s revenue-neutral carbon tax had a statistically signifi-
cant negative carbon tax effect and positive revenue-recycling effect on manufacturing plants’ pro-
ductivity. On average, the carbon tax effect reduced productivity annually by 1.2% while the
revenue-recycling effect increased productivity by 0.2%, offsetting the negative carbon tax effect
by approximately 20%. The policy led to a net loss in productivity by 1%. Yet, once I allow
for heterogeneity, some plants experienced a net gain in productivity. These plants are the ones
with a positive taxable income, but little carbon tax expenditure. For those plants, the productivity
dividend hypothesis was supported. These findings provide evidence that recycling tax revenues
through the reductions of the CIT rates can alleviate some negative productivity impacts from the
carbon tax, and may lead to a net gain in productivity.
To put this in context, one can interpret these declines in productivity in terms of output
(value-added). Assuming that inputs are held constant, on average, plant’s output fell annually
by $150,000 in response to the policy.3 Without the CIT reduction, output would have declined by
$160,000, implying that recycling tax revenues through the reduction of CIT helped save output
by $10,000. By aggregating plant-level estimates, the finding suggests that BC’s manufacturing
output fell by $440 million annually while the CIT reduction saved output by $25 million.
This paper makes several contributions. Firstly, this paper develops a new hypothesis related
to the double dividend hypothesis of environmental tax reforms. The traditional double dividend
hypothesis suggests that the revenue-neutral substitution of the environmental tax for existing dis-
tortionary taxes leads to welfare or employment gains (Goulder, 1995).4 The PDH introduces a
new possibility that revenue-recycling could also enhance productivity in addition to welfare and
employment.
Furthermore, this paper estimates the revenue-recycling effect of an environmental tax, provid-
ing the first empirical test of the double dividend hypothesis in terms of productivity. No study in
the literature has ever separately estimated both the carbon tax and revenue-recycling effects. The
empirical approach used in this paper can be applied to estimate these two effects of environmental
3This is calculated as taking the average of plant-level output effects. The plant-level output effect is calculated as
the difference between the counterfactual output (= Yi/(1 − %1TFPi ), e.g., if the productivity effect is -0.2% with
$1 million observed output, the counterfactual output is $1.002 million.
4The effect could also be zero.
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taxes in general.
Secondly, this paper contributes to the broader literature on the productivity impacts of envi-
ronmental policies.5 There are two types of environmental policies, command-and-control and
market-based policies. Early studies have mostly focused on the former policy, e.g., the US Clean
Air Act, and found that environmental regulations hamper productivity in narrowly defined sub-
industries within the manufacturing sector.6 More recently, Greenstone, List and Syverson (2012)
have conducted a large-scale study of the 1970 US Clean Air Act Amendments using the plant-
level data covering the entire US manufacturing sector. They found that plants in regulated counties
experienced a decline in TFP by 4.8%.
While this literature is relatively extensive, there is little work examining the productivity effect
of market-based policy, e.g., carbon pricing policies. Commins et al. (2011) and Lutz (2016) have
both investigated the European Union Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) while Martin, de Preux
and Wagner (2014) examined the UK energy tax. What is different about the market-based policy
is that it provides incentives for polluters to respond to the policy in a flexible fashion. Commins
et al. found that the first phase of the EU-ETS negatively affected European manufacturing firms’
TFP.7 On the other hand, Lutz found the EU-ETS had a positive productivity effect during the first
phase, but no effect during the second phase on German manufacturing firms.8 Martin, de Preux
and Wagner also found no effect of the energy tax on UK manufacturing plants. Although the
empirical evidence is limited, the productivity effects of the carbon pricing policies seem to be
much less detrimental than those of command-and-control policies. This may be exactly due to the
incentives provided by the policy for innovations and investments to improve input efficiency. This
paper adds to this literature by showing that such incentives can be provided by recycling the tax
revenues raised by the policy. Thus, this paper shows the importance of estimating both the carbon
tax and revenue-recycling effects. Estimating both effects separately allows me to evaluate another
important channel through which market-based policies may positively affect productivity.
Thirdly, this paper improves upon previous studies by constructing a measure of TFP more
accurately. I do this by employing a semi-parametric estimation method proposed by Ackerberg,
Caves and Frazer (2015) – henceforth ACF. I further revised the ACF method by following De
5See Koz´luk and Zipperer (2015) and Dechezlepretre and Sato (2017) for the survey of this literature.
6One exception is Berman and Bui (2001). They examined a stricter air quality regulation imposed on the Los
Angeles Air Basin and found a positive productivity effect in oil refineries. Although their empirical estimate was
positive, it was statistically insignificant, and its confidence interval ranged from 19% to −9%. This result is consis-
tent with the results found in Greenstone, List and Syverson (2012). Their estimate for the refinery sector was also
statistically insignificant and its confidence interval ranged from 2% to −3%.
7The credibility of the findings of Commins et al. (2011) has been questioned by many papers as their treatment
variable is defined at the sector-level. Their estimates may be severely biased due to the measurement errors and
confounding sector shocks.
8The first phase of the EU-ETS was an experimental phase when the price of allowances was zero due to the excess
supply. Thus, the second phase might be seen as the actual policy.
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Loecker (2007) and Lutz (2016). As a response to the policy involves investment, I must allow the
policy to influence a plant’s future productivity. To do so, I directly enter the policy into the produc-
tivity process. I also enter important plant heterogeneity that is related to behavioral responses to
carbon tax, such as energy efficiency. In addition, this paper further improves the measure of TFP
by using direct capital input data. This addresses an issue in estimating the production function
when there is a measurement error in capital input (Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, 2016)
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the BC
carbon tax. Section 3 defines the Productivity Dividend Hypothesis (PDH). I provide a simple
model to explain the PDH. Section 4 presents the research design while section 5 explains the
data. The empirical findings are presented in section 6. Section 7 discusses the counterfactual
experiment where the tax revenue is recycled entirely through the CIT reduction. Finally, section
8 concludes. More general treatment of the model, detailed exploration of data, and additional
robustness checks are in the Appendix.
2. Background of the BC Carbon Tax
The Ministry of Finance formally announced the implementation of carbon tax in their Febru-
ary 2008 budget plan. Only five months later, the tax was implemented on July 1st, 2008. The an-
nouncement surprised the public given the past political actions taken by the Liberal government
(Harrison, 2013). The tax was originally criticized by northern and rural communities, arguing
that tax burden might fall on them unfairly due to their colder climate. Even with some negative
reactions, polls indicated that a majority of voters in BC supported the introduction of carbon tax.
Thus far, despite the regime change from the Liberal Party to the New Democratic Party after the
2017 general election, the carbon tax has survived since the announcement and implementation.
The BC carbon tax is levied on the carbon content of all fossil fuels initially at $10/t CO2e. The
rate increased by $5/t CO2e annually until it reached $30 in 2012, making it the highest carbon
tax in the world (Murray and Rivers, 2015). The rate was kept at $30 until 2018 when it increased
to $35 on April 1. It will continue to annually increase by $5 and reach $50 in 2021 (Ministry
of Finance, 2017). These increases are set to meet the carbon pricing requirements in the Pan-
Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. This framework is a collective plan
set out by the federal government to reduce emissions in Canada. British Columbia joined this
framework in 2016. Under this framework, the carbon tax rate is required to be at $50 by 2022.
The BC carbon tax rate will reach this requirement in 2021 and will be kept at $50 for 2022.
As each fuel has a different carbon content, the rate is adjusted accordingly. For example, the
carbon tax increased the price of gasoline by 2.34 cents per liter, rising gradually to 6.67 cents per
liter in 2012 (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Increasing the tax rate gradually allows consumers to
5
adjust their fuel usage slowly and minimize the financial burden from the tax.
In designing carbon pricing policy, certain exemptions are often made to avoid potential nega-
tive impacts to the economy.9 The exemptions are considered to address the concerns raised by the
public and policymakers about losing competitiveness of regulated industries. At the same time,
such compromises could be costly and lead to welfare losses due to the tax base erosion and in-
creases of dead-weight loss (Bo¨hringer and Rutherford, 1997). On the other hand, the BC carbon
tax was designed initially with no exemptions, making the tax base broad.10
One of the unique aspects of the BC carbon tax is the revenue-neutrality. It is meant not only
to minimize the potential adverse impact on the economy, but also to gain more support from the
business community. Although business leaders expressed their support for the tax when they
were approached by the Premier’s office in late 2007, their support was contingent on the revenue-
neutrality. According to the Budget and Fiscal Plan (Ministry of Finance, 2015), the carbon tax
raised about $1.2 billion revenue annually since 2012 when the tax rate has stopped increasing at
$30/t CO2e. These revenues are used to reduce the rate of personal and corporate income taxes
and provide lump-sum transfers to low-income households. In detail, the personal income tax was
reduced by 5 percent over the first two years for the two lowest income brackets (i.e., those earning
less than $70,000 per year) while the general and small corporate income taxes were reduced from
12 to 10 percent and 4.5 to 2.5 percent over the first three years, respectively (Ministry of Finance,
2008).11 In addition, a one-time Climate Action Dividend of $100 per adult was provided in the
initial year to help begin the transition to a lower-carbon lifestyle. To respond to the concerns
raised by northern and rural communities, as of the 2011 tax year they are given a further benefit
of $200.
Although the government had designed this policy to be revenue-neutral, tax credits have been
exceeding tax revenues since its implementation, an average excess of $128 million over the first
six years. The government has no intention of making the policy a part of the province’s stimulus
package. This discrepancy simply stems from failing to accurately estimate the expected revenue
from the carbon tax. The estimated revenues have been lower than anticipated since the imple-
mentation due to the much higher decline in consumption of fossil fuels. Although the policy has
9For example, manufacturing and horticulture sectors are entirely exempted from the energy tax in Sweden while
various transport sectors are exempt from the carbon tax in Norway (see Ekins and Speck (1999) for more examples
of exemptions in Europe).
10In March 2012, a carbon tax relief was granted to commercial greenhouse growers to protect the competitiveness
of agricultural industries against producers in the United States and Mexico (Murray and Rivers, 2015). Temporary
relief of $7.6 million was provided in 2012, and then the relief program was made into a permanent program in 2013.
As of January 1, 2014, the purchase of colored gasoline and colored diesel fuel used for farm purposes are exempted.
For further information, see http:www.gov.bc.ca/agri/.
11These made BC’s corporate and personal income taxes the lowest in Canada. In fact, BC has tied with Alberta
and New Brunswick for the lowest corporate tax rate, and has had the lowest personal income tax rate in Canada, but
for only those earnings up to $119,000 (Elgie and McClay, 2013).
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been revenue-negative, given that the excesses account only for less than 1 percent of BC’s total
tax revenue, I treat it as revenue-neutral in this analysis to be consistent with the intention of the
BC government.
3. The Productivity Dividend Hypothesis
In this section, I briefly explain how a revenue-neutral carbon tax affects the productivity of
manufacturing plants.12 A simple model motivates my empirical method discussed in Section 4.
Consider a partial equilibrium model with an iso-elastic demand for manufacturing goods:
x = p−σ B (3.1)
where B is a constant representing aggregate quantity and price indexes, and p is the price for the
manufacturing goods.
Following Copeland and Taylor (1994), I assume there is a joint production technology for
manufacturing plants:13
x = A(1− θ)F(K , L) (3.2)
Z = ϕ(θ)F(K , L) (3.3)
where x is manufacturing output and Z is emission.14 I assume that capital (K ) and labor (L) are
used to produce the potential output, F(K , L). We can think of x to be the net output because
some are allocated to abatement. ϕ(θ) is an abatement function, satisfying ϕ(0) = 1, ϕ(1) = 0,
and dϕ/dθ < 0. θ ∈ [0, 1] is a fraction of inputs allocated to abatement. This means that the level
of emission decreases with abatement, but at the cost of output.
Now following Forslid, Okubo and Ulltveit-Moe (2018), I express the abatement function of
Copeland and Taylor (1994) as follows::
ϕ(θ) = (1− θ)
1/α
(IA)
(3.4)
with 0 < a < 1, and (IA) is the abatement augmenting technology, which is a function of abate-
ment investment, IA. It satisfies d(IA)/d IA > 0 and is the reciprocal of the amount of emission
12I am grateful for my advisors, Kenneth J. McKenzie and M. Scott Taylor, for their valuable suggestions that have
helped to improve this section.
13This is a joint production as producing one unit of output (F) produces x unit of emission, i.e., x = AF(K , L)
and z = x if there is no abatement.
14Technically, the input augmenting technology, A, is applied to all inputs including emission. Thus, AZ =
ϕ(θ)AF(K , L).
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produced per output.15 This can be interpreted as a technological parameter for the abatement ac-
tivity, i.e., an increase in(.) is an improvement in the abatement technology. Eq.(3.4) reflects that
plants can reduce their emissions by increasing θ or increasing the abatement investment. From
Eq.(3.2), TFP can be expressed as A(1 − θ). This implies that TFP increases with less resources
allocated to the abatement activities.
By solving plant’s problem, I show below how a revenue-neutral carbon tax affects the term,
(1− θ). Using Eq.(3.2) and Eq.(3.3), output can be shown to be:
x = A((IA)Z)aF(K , L)1−a (3.5)
With this formulation, one can think of Z as an input and re-interpret it as energy.16 Further, let
e ≡ Z/x be energy intensity. Substituting Z = ex into Eq.(3.5), and then solving for x yields:
x = A1/1−α((IA)e)α/(1−α)F (3.6)
This shows that A(1−θ) = A1/1−α((IA)e)α/(1−α). There are four decision processes that a plant
goes through. First, the plant chooses how much to invest in abatement given the optimal pricing
rule. Second, it sets its optimal pricing rule given abatement investments. Third, it chooses how
much to abatement. Lastly, it chooses how much capital and labor to use to produce output. Thus,
I solve backward to find an expression for plant’s TFP, specifically (IA) and e, as a function of
the carbon tax and corporate income tax (CIT).
Cost minimization
The minimum cost of producing a unit of F can be found by solving the following problem:
cF(r˜ , w˜) = min
(k,l)
{
w˜l + r˜ k : F(k, l) = 1
}
(3.7)
where r˜ ≡ (1 − λk tc)r and w˜ ≡ (1 − tc)w. r and w are the prices of capital and labor, respec-
tively. tc is the CIT rate. Following McKenzie and Ferede (2017), I assume that labor cost is fully
deductible for tax purposes while only a portion λk ≥ 0 of the capital cost is deductible.
15This parameter is 1 in Copeland and Taylor (1994) as they assume one unit of gross output produces one unit of
emission.
16A concept of abatement in Copeland and Taylor (1994) is relevant here although regulation they consider is either
emission tax or emission standard. Once I interpret Z as energy and θ as a fraction of inputs allocated to energy-saving
activities, such as R&D expenditure allocated to energy-saving technology, the formulation of Copeland and Taylor
(1994) is still valid. Tombe and Winter (2015) argue that “one might loosely interpret abatement as any costly activity
that lowers the use of emissions-relevant energy, such as substitution between different fuel types.” For this reason,
investment in energy-saving technology, fuel switching, and factor substitution can all be interpreted as abatement in
the definition of Copeland and Taylor (1994).
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λk is a highly stylized representation of many CIT systems, intending to reflect the distortionary
features of the CIT with regard to capital. The typical case would be λk < 1 because the real cost
of capital is not fully deductible. This is because only the nominal cost of debt finance is fully
deductible. λk > 1 is also possible when the tax system subsidizes capital.17 When λk = 1, the
full opportunity of cost of capital is deducted, and the CIT is a tax on economic profit (i.e., the CIT
is not distortionary).
I assume that F(k, l) = kβl1−β . Then the cost function can be shown as:
cF(r˜ , w˜) = κβ r˜βw˜1−β (3.8)
where κβ ≡ β−β(1−β)β−1. Next, the plant determines how much to abate by solving the following
cost minimization problem:
cx(τ˜ , cF) = min
(z,F)
{
τ˜ z + cF(r˜ , w˜)F : A((IA)z)αF1−α = 1} (3.9)
where τ˜ ≡ (1 − tc)τ . τ is the carbon tax inclusive energy price.18 I assume that energy cost is
fully deductible for the tax purpose. Solving the cost minimization problem yields the conditional
input function for energy and cost function:
z = 1
A(IA)α
(
α
1− α
cF
τ˜
)1−α
(3.10)
cx(τ˜ , cF) = κaA−1(IA)−αcF1−α τ˜α (3.11)
where κa ≡ α−α(1 − α)α−1. Then, using the definition of energy intensity, Eq.(3.10) can be
plugged into Eq.(3.6) as Z/x = z = e, and I can express TFP as a function of the abatement
technology, carbon tax, and CIT:
TFP = A
(
α
1− α
)α(
(IA)
cF
τ˜
)α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1−θ)
(3.12)
This shows that the abatement technology plays an important role in the productivity effect of the
revenue-neutral carbon tax.
17λk > 1 is possible due to accelerated depreciation, investment allowances, investment tax credits, etc (McKenzie
and Ferede, 2017).
18Here I am abstracting away from any changes in the tax-exclusive energy price. Thus, all the changes in the
carbon tax inclusive energy price are due to the changes in the carbon tax rate. Henceforth, I call τ carbon tax.
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Profit maximization
Next, the plant sets the pricing rule given the abatement investment, and then chooses how
much to invest in abatement given the pricing rule.
Pricing rule
Profit maximization by a monopolistic competitive manufacturing plant yields a pricing rule:
p = σ
σ − 1
cx
1− tc (3.13)
Using Eq.(3.1) and Eq.(3.13), plant’s profit can be expressed as:
pi = B(1− σ)σ−1σ−σ (1− tc)−σ cx1−σ − (1− tc)IA (3.14)
Here, similar to labor cost, I assume that the abatement investment cost is fully deductible.19
Optimal abatement investment
Finally, I derive an expression for IA as a function of τ and tc. Following Forslid, Okubo and
Ulltveit-Moe (2018), I assume that (IA) = I ρA with ρ > 0. Plugging Eq.(3.11) into Eq.(3.14),
and then maximizing plant’s profit with respect to abatement investment IA yield:
IA = A
σ−1
γ 0
1
γ τ
− α(σ−1)γ
(
1− λk tc
1− tc
)− β(1−α)(σ−1)γ
(3.15)
where 0 ≡ αρBσ−σ (σ − 1)σ (κaκ1−αβ )1−σ (rβw1−β)(1−α)(1−σ) and γ ≡ 1 − αρ(σ − 1) > 0.20
Before plugging Eq.(3.15) back into Eq.(3.12) to discuss the productivity effect of the abatement
investment, it is worth interpreting Eq.(3.15). Notice that when the costs of capital investments are
fully deductible, i.e., λk = 1, Eq.(3.15) becomes independent of the CIT. This is simply because
when the CIT is levied on the pure profit, there is no distortion in the capital investment market.
Eq.(3.15) shows that the abatement investment is a decreasing function of carbon tax. However,
Forslid, Okubo and Ulltveit-Moe (2018) point out that the effect of carbon tax on the abatement
investment is ambiguous because carbon tax indirectly affects the abatement investment through
the market competition, i.e., through 0. If the plant’s competitors pay more carbon tax, then it
provides the plant an incentive to invest more in abatement.
On the other hand, the abatement investment is a decreasing function of the CIT.21 This implies
19Alternatively, I can also allow the abatement investment cost to be not fully deductible like capital cost. See
Appendix A for more.
20In order to satisfy the second order condition of the profit maximization problem, γ has to be positive. See
Appendix A for the verification.
21See Appendix A for the verification.
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that the reduction of the CIT rate has a positive effect on abatement investment.22
Finally, plugging Eq.(3.15) into Eq.(3.12) yields:
TFP = A1/γ 0˜ τ− αγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Carbon tax
(
1− λk tc
1− tc
)−µγ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue-recycling
(3.16)
where 0˜ ≡ ( α1−α )α0 αργ (κβrβw1−β)α and µ ≡ αβ(ρ(σ − 1)− 1).
Besides the Hick-neutral technology parameter, A, Eq.(3.16) shows that there are two channels
through which revenue-neutral carbon tax affects TFP.23 First, paying tax on energy purchased has
a direct effect on TFP. I refer to it as the carbon tax effect. Eq.(3.16) shows that the carbon tax
effect on productivity is ambiguous as carbon tax also affects abatement investment through the
market competition, 0, hence positively affecting TFP.24 There are two opposing channels within
this carbon tax effect, a positive effect from the increases in abatement investment and a negative
effect from the resource diversion.
Second, a decline in the CIT rate indirectly affects TFP. I refer to it as the revenue-recycling
effect. Eq.(3.16) shows that the revenue-recycling effect increases TFP when 1 ≤ ρ(σ − 1). This
means that the reduction of the CIT will likely to have a positive impact on TFP when the abatement
technology improves faster with the abatement investment, and the goods are more substitutable.
The revenue-recycling effect positively affects TFP by reducing the distortion in the capital market
created by the CIT. Notice again that when the costs of capital are fully deductible, Eq.(3.16)
becomes independent of the CIT. This suggests that the revenue-recycling effect of carbon tax on
productivity comes entirely from the distortionary nature of the CIT.
With these two effects, it is clear that the productivity effect of the revenue-neutral carbon tax
could go either direction. Yet, it could positively affect the plant’s TFP. To summarize my model
predictions, I develop a (empirically testable) hypothesis:
Hypothesis I: Recycling tax revenues by reducing corporate income tax rates increases productivity-
enhancing investments.
22In addition, lowering the CIT rate increases investments in general. Lowering the user costs of capital encourages
plants to invest more. This may make plants more productivity through the increase in A.
23In addition, one could also imagine that plants might substitute away from fuels to non-fuel inputs in response to
the carbon tax. This channel could be linked to the changes in α. However, given that α is affecting Eq.(3.16) in much
more complex fashion, I assume that α is constant in this paper. I also abstract away from the TFP effect through wage
(w) and rental rate (r ). As the incidence of the CIT may fall onto labor in terms of wages, the reduction of the CIT
rate may also positively affect the plant’s TFP through a higher wage. On the other hand, the rental rate is unlikely to
respond to the policy because it is determined at the world market (e.g., small open economy assumption).
24This model prediction can also be related to the Porter hypothesis, i.e., carbon tax positively affects productivity
through increases in investment.
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Hypothesis II: If the revenue-recycling increases productivity more than the carbon tax lowers pro-
ductivity by diverting resources away from production, the policy achieves a net productivity gain.
I name this two-part hypothesis the “Productivity Dividend Hypothesis” (PDH). The first part of
the PDH is only about the revenue-recycling effect. One may need to test whether the revenue-
recycling through the CIT reduction increases investments, and thus productivity. In this paper, I
evaluate whether the revenue-recycling has a positive productivity effect. Then when the positive
revenue-recycling effect exceeds or completely offsets the negative carbon tax effect, the policy
supports the PDH.25
Furthermore, as this has an obvious connection to the double dividend hypothesis of environ-
mental tax reforms, when a policy achieves both emission reduction and productivity enhance-
ment, such a policy offers a double dividend. I call this the ”Productivity Double Dividend (PDD)
Hypothesis.” This hypothesis is similar to the employment double dividend hypothesis when the
second dividend is employment gains. Although these are defined specifically with carbon taxes,
this can be applied to any environmental taxes that recycle the tax revenues via the tax substitutions
as well.
In the next section, I take Eq.(3.16) to data and estimate the productivity effect of the BC carbon
tax to evaluate the PDH. A TFP equation can be approximated with a linear function as:
TFPi t = β1τi t + β2(1− tci t)+ i t (3.17)
where τi t is the carbon tax rate and (1 − tci t) is the net-of-the CIT rate for plant i at time t . β1
captures the carbon tax effect and β2 captures the revenue-recycling effect through the reduction
of the CIT rate. However, I do not observe plant-level carbon tax rate or CIT rate because these
taxes are only levied at provincial-level. Thus, I take advantage of rich data and interact these
provincial tax rates with plant-level characteristics to approximate τi t and (1 − tci t). I discuss the
detail in the next section.
25There is one another case when a policy can achieve a net productivity gain. That is when both carbon tax and
revenue-recycling effects are positive. When the carbon tax effect is positive, that provides support for the Porter
hypothesis. The combination of the Porter hypothesis and the positive revenue-recycling effect can also support the
PDH.
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4. Research Design
4.1. Empirical Framework
This section discusses the econometric design to estimate the effect of the BC carbon tax
on manufacturing plants’ productivity. I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator, i.e.,
comparing the plants in BC with plants in the rest of Canada (ROC). The simple model illustrated
that the productivity effect depends on the carbon tax and CIT rates, affecting the decisions on
resource allocations including abatement investment. With available data, I augment the DID es-
timation with the information from the model, using plant-level heterogeneity to proxy plant-level
policy exposures.26 I estimate the following equation:
ln TFPi j pt = β1CTaxi pt + β2Recyclingi pt + X pt + φi + λ j t + i j pt (4.1)
where ln TFPi j pt is the log of TFP for plant i in industry j in province p at time t , which is
estimated using the semiparametric estimation method proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer
(2015).27 This method addresses the problem of endogeneity in the input decisions and is argued to
be the most robust among other estimation methods (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). I define CTaxi pt ≡(∑
f Fuel
f
i ×CTax fpt
)
/VAi and Recyclingi pt ≡ 1(TIi > 0)×(1−CITpt). Let Fueli be an average
consumption of fuel f for plant i from the pre-policy period (2004-2007), CTax fpt be a fuel-specific
carbon tax variable (e.g., for gasoline, 0 if t = pre-carbon tax period for BC plants, 2.34 cents/liter
if t = 2008, 3.51 if t = 2009, 4.45 in t = 2010, 5.56 if t = 2011, and 6.67 if t = 2012 for
BC plants. 0 for ROC plants for all t), and VAi be a pre-policy average value-added for plant
i . TIi is a pre-policy average taxable corporate income for plant i .28 CITpt is BC’s corporate
income tax rate. 1(TIi > 0) is an indicator function that takes one when average taxable income
during the pre-policy period is strictly positive.29 X pt is a control variable at province-level, such
as provincial GDP. φi are plant fixed effects that capture time-invariant plant heterogeneity while
λ j t are industry-specific time fixed effects that controls for industry specific shocks at given year.
Finally, i j pt is an error term that captures idiosyncratic changes in productivity.
The Recyclingi pt term allows me to evaluate the first part of the PDH while the first two terms
26This augmentation is inspired by Yamazaki (2017).
27See Online Appendix D.D.1 for further details on the construction of TFP measure. De Loecker (2007) and
Lutz (2016) further extend the OP/LP/ACF method by allowing determinants of production to enter the productivity
process. Such determinants include the export status (De Loecker, 2007), R&D status (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu,
2013), and the EU-ETS (Lutz, 2016).
28If a plant is owned by a multi-plant firm, TIi ≡ si × TIe with ∑i∈e si = 1 where si is the output share of plant i
within firm e and TIe is the taxable income for firm e.
29I also test the robustness of the estimates using different thresholds and find similar results, presented in Table C.2
in Appendix C.
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together evaluate the second part of the PDH of the BC carbon tax. The first term measures the car-
bon tax effect (β1) while the second term measures the revenue-recycling effect (β2). The carbon
tax effect is the productivity effect coming directly from taxing the energy purchased. Calculating
the fuel-specific carbon tax expenditure allows me to exploit the plant-level variation in the finan-
cial tax burden. I hypothesize that the higher CTaxi pt is, the larger the tax burden is for this plant.
β1 can also measure the productivity effect of the carbon tax without the reduction of the corporate
income tax. The revenue-recycling effect is the productivity effect coming from the reduction of
the CIT rate. Interacting the positive taxable corporate income indicator with the net-of-the CIT
rate allows me to observe how much of the financial benefits a (tax-paying) plant receives from the
revenue-recycling of this carbon tax. This is based on a logic that plants with non-positive taxable
income (i.e., in-loss plants) would not receive any benefits from the revenue-recycling. This allows
me to exploit the plant-level variation in the financial benefit of the policy.
The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. In particular, the approximate percentage change
in productivity for plant i at time t in response to the carbon tax is calculated by αi t ≡ 100 ×
(βˆ11CTaxi pt+βˆ21Recyclingi pt).30 The estimated coefficient βˆ1 and βˆ2 are estimated from across
plant × province comparisons over time.
To properly estimate the productivity effect, the underlying identification assumption requires
that there be no factors other than the carbon tax creating differences in changes in productivity
between plants in BC and plants in other provinces.31 This assumption will be violated if the
government of BC concurrently implements other policy induced by the carbon tax that affects all
plants in BC differently while no other provinces implement a similar policy. Another important
identification assumption is common trends. This assumption requires that the changes in pro-
ductivity for plants in BC (treatment group) and other provinces (control group) would follow the
same time trend in the absence of the carbon tax. This implies that the plants in BC and ROC are
similar and thus would experience the same level of productivity effect if they are all subject to the
carbon tax. Although including the fixed effects and time-varying control variables can control for
various confounding factors, the estimates will be biased if treated and control plants are inherently
different, especially in the pre-treatment period.32
To ensure the similarity between treated plants (BC) and control plants (ROC), I take advantage
of the rich data and estimate Eq.(4.1) with weights based on propensity scores – PSW-DID esti-
30As the estimation equation is in the semi-elasticity (log-linear) form, the exact percentage change in productivity
is calculated by 100×
(
eβˆ11CTaxi pt+βˆ21Recyclingi pt − 1
)
.
31Additionally, the identification requires that treated and control plants are similar in their plant characteristics so
that they would respond to the policy in a similar fashion. This assumption may, especially, be called into question for
identifying the revenue-recycling effect because one may argue that tax-paying and in-loss plants operate differently.
In Appendix B.B.2, I explore this concern and show that these plants are comparable.
32To ensure that the results are not biased by the pre-treatment trends (effects), I show that the treatment variables
in Eq.(4.1) are not statistically significant in the pre-treatment period, presented in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
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mator. More weights are given to control plants that resemble treated plants. The weight of one is
given to the treated plans while the weights, pi (X)1−pi (X) , are given to the control plants.
33 The propen-
sity scores are estimated using a probit model. The observable pre-treatment plant characteristics
that are related to the carbon tax are used as predictors of the treatment assignment.34 A full list
of covariates used for estimating the propensity scores is presented in Table B.2 in Appendix C.35
Re-weighting plants based on this rich set of observable pre-treatment characteristics allows me to
compare similar treated and control plants in many dimensions and credibly isolate the effect of
the policy on manufacturing productivity.36
5. Data Sources
To evaluate the productivity dividend hypothesis, two of Statistics Canada’s confidential dataset
are linked, the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and General Index of Financial Information
(GIFI).37 The ASM is an annual survey that contains information on manufacturing activities for
all manufacturing locations in Canada.38 I obtain information on output, employment, and inter-
mediates (raw materials and energy consumptions) from the ASM. What is missing from the ASM
is information on capital, which I obtain from the GIFI.39 The GIFI is an extensive list of financial
statement items, which businesses use to file their T2 corporate income tax return. One advantage
of the GIFI is that unlike other studies that must rely on the perpetual inventory method or a proxy
to construct a capital stock variable, it provides a direct measure of capital input. This helps to
address an issue in estimating the production function when there is a measurement error in input
variables.
From the ASM-GIFI linked data, I take advantage of the rich data and obtain necessary vari-
ables to employ the PSW-DID method in estimating Eq.(4.1), such as energy expenditure by fuel
types (e.g., electricity, gasoline, natural gas, etc), taxable corporate income, plant age, export, and
etc.
33 pi (X) is the estimated probability for plant i being treated conditioning on the covariates, X . The weights are
normalized such that their average is equal to one among control plants.
34Only the period of 2004-2006 is used to estimate the propensity score. This is because by using all pre-treatment
years, the common trend assumption will hold by construction, which is not meaningful. I leave out 2007 to see if the
common trend assumption will still hold despite matching only on the 2004-2006 period.
35I also included a square term of the covariates to improve the balancing (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia
and Wahba, 2002).
36I demonstrate the effectiveness of the propensity score re-weighting in Appendix B.B.3.
37I explain the detail of the linkage of these two data in Appendix B.B.1.
38Although the ASM is a survey data, over the sample period it is essentially a census with data on smaller firms
being filled with administrative records. The further details of the ASM are provided in http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/
imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&Id=504733.
39The further details of the GIFI are provided in https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/
forms-publications/publications/rc4088/general-index-financial-information-gifi.html.
15
99
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 L
og
 o
f T
FP
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ROC BC
Figure 1: Trends of TFP
Note: This figure plots the trends of TFP for BC and ROC. ROC (Adjusted) is the same as ROC, but added the pre-
policy average gap of TFP between BC and ROC.
Source: Author’s calculation.
There are about 77,000 plants (10,000 plants in BC and 65,000 plants in ROC), 86 sub-
industries (4 digit NAICS level), 13 regions (10 provinces and 3 territories), and 9 years (2004-
2012) in the data.40
Estimated TFP
Before I present the main results, I provide summary statistics of the estimated TFP, presented
in Figure 1 and Table 1. Figure 1 plots the trend of TFP for BC and ROC. Overall trends are
increasing for both BC and ROC over the sample period, except there is a noticeable decline for
BC in 2008. Many might argue that this could be due to the global financial crisis that took place at
the same time as the implementation of the BC carbon tax. If so, we should expect to see a similar
decline for ROC as well. However, we actually observe the opposite, i.e., TFP increased in 2008
for ROC. This is one suggestive evidence that the BC carbon tax might have contributed to this
difference in TFP between BC and ROC.
In addition, to credibly identify the productivity effect of the policy, the pre-policy TFP trend
between plants in BC and plants in ROC must be parallel. It is clear from Figure 1 that they are.
40Although the survey has been conducted annually since 1917, there was a major change to its survey design in
2004. To preserve the consistency in the data, I decided to only use the 2004-2012 period. For further information
about the changes in the survey, see http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getMainChange&Id=3060.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the estimated productivity (lnTFP)
Level Growth
BC ROC Difference BC ROC Difference Standardized
Difference
Pre 9.86 9.85 0.010 0.192 0.343 -0.151**
(0.78) (0.83) (0.01) (6.01) (6.69) (0.06) -0.024
2004 9.85 9.83 0.023
(0.82) (0.87) (0.01)
2005 9.83 9.82 0.009 0.041 0.076 -0.035
(0.78) (0.81) (0.01) (6.79) (6.73) (0.13) -0.005
2006 9.87 9.86 0.008 0.452 0.532 -0.080
(0.76) (0.79) (0.01) (5.87) (6.06) (0.11) -0.013
2007 9.89 9.89 -0.002 0.084 0.419 -0.334***
(0.75) (0.83) (0.01) (5.31) (7.22) (0.10) -0.053
Post 9.91 10.00 -0.088***
(0.79) (0.79) (0.01)
DID -0.098***
(0.01)
Note: Standard deviations are in the parenthesis except values in the parenthesis for the column for
Difference are standard errors. T -tests on the mean differences between BC and ROC are performed.
A null hypothesis is that the difference in group means is zero. Standardized differences are calcu-
lated as Y treated−Y control√
(s2treated+s2control)/2
, and correct the t-statistics of the T -test for the sample size. The value for
DID, reported in the last row, is calculated by taking the difference of time-differences (difference
between pre- and post-policy) for BC and ROC.
After normalizing the trends, the trends start to deviate from each other in the same year as the
implementation of the policy. I further performed t-tests on the difference in means during the pre-
carbon tax years between BC and ROC, presented in Table 1. Differences in means of the level of
productivity are not statistically different from zero. While the difference in means of the growth
of productivity is statistically different from zero over the entire pre-policy period and 2007. While
these results from the t-tests may raise a concern that the pre-policy TFP trend may not be parallel,
many practitioners of the DID method claim that the t-test on the mean differences is misleading
especially when the sample size is large (e.g., Imbens (2015)). As the t-statistics takes into account
such a large sample size, a small difference in means between two groups can be statistically
significant even if it is substantively small. To mitigate this issue, I also calculated the standardized
differences for the growth of productivity to test the parallel trends, reported in the last column
of Table 1. Unlike the t-statistics, the standardized differences are independent of the sample
size. The standardized differences are substantially smaller. As the standardized differences being
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greater than 0.25 indicates that the mean differences are statistically different from zero (Stuart
and Rubin, 2008), Table 1 illustrates that the pre-policy productivity trends between BC and ROC
plants are parallel.
As a start, I calculated differences in TFP between BC and ROC before and after the policy,
presented in the last row of Table 1. This simple calculation shows that manufacturing productivity
declined by 10% in response to the carbon tax in BC. Now with this suggestive finding, I present
the main results using the more rigorous econometric technique to identify the productivity effect
of this policy.
6. Results
The results are presented in the following subsections. Section 6.6.1 presents estimates of
Eq.(4.1) to evaluate the PDH while the rest of the subsections presents the results from robustness
checks, heterogeneous effects, and dynamic effects. All analyses employ the propensity-score-
weighted DID estimator.
6.1. Carbon Tax and Revenue-recycling Effects
The results of three specifications based on Eq.(4.1) are reported in column 4 through 6 of Table
2. Each column reports coefficients estimated using a different level of the industry by year fixed
effects, 2-digit NAICS by year, 3-digit NAICS by year, and 4-digit NAICS by year, respectively.
These estimates are identified with clustered standard errors.41 In the last row, I present the F
statistics from the joint test for the significance of β1 and β2 together, i.e., H0: β1 = β2 = 0.
Before I discuss the results from estimating Eq.(4.1), I briefly explain the importance of Eq.(4.1).
An alternative to Eq.(4.1), one can employ a simpler version of Eq.(4.1), which has a similar taste
to a conventional DID estimator:
ln TFPi j pt = βCTaxpt + X pt + φi + λ j t + i j pt (6.1)
where CTaxpt is a carbon tax variable (i.e., for BC plants 0 if t = pre-carbon tax period, 10 if t =
2008, 15 if t = 2009, ..., 30 if t = 2012 and 0 for ROC plants) and the rest is defined as in Eq.(4.1).
While this approach is intuitive and straightforward, it is difficult to isolate the productivity effect
41Cameron and Miller (2015) suggest clustering at the broadest feasible level, which in this case the province-level.
One may worry about too few cluster groups as there are only 10 provinces (including BC) in Canada. Alternatively,
I could cluster at the industry by province-level to increase the number of cluster groups, which would ignore the
within-province correlation. However, Mackinnon and Webb (2019) show that under-clustering (i.e., clustering at the
industry by province) suffers from a severe over-rejection, implying that ignoring the within-province correlation is
worse than having too few cluster groups.
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Table 2: Impact of the Carbon Tax on Plant Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CTaxpt -0.0038*** -0.0034*** -0.0031***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
CTaxi pt (β1) -5.13** -8.21*** -7.35***
(1.76) (1.83) (1.30)
Recyclingi pt (β2) 0.155** 0.135* 0.13*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Industry × time
2-digit Y Y
3-digit Y Y
4-digit Y Y
N 237,478 237,478 237,478 237,333 237,333 237,333
R2 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.67
F-statistics 5.3 23.3 62.5
Notes: Dependent variable is log of TFP. CTaxpt is a carbon tax variable (i.e., for BC plants 0 if t =
pre-carbon tax period, 10 if t = 2008, 15 if t = 2009, ..., 30 if t = 2012 and 0 for ROC plants.);
CTaxi pt ≡
(∑
f Fuel
f
i × CTax fpt
)
/VAi ; Fueli is an average consumption of fuel f for plant i from
the pre-policy period (2004-2007); CTax fpt is a fuel-specific carbon tax variable (e.g., for gasoline,
0 if t = pre-carbon tax period for BC plants, 2.34 cents/liter if t = 2008, 3.51 if t = 2009, 4.45 in
t = 2010, 5.56 if t = 2011, and 6.67 if t = 2012 for BC plants. 0 for ROC plants at all t);VAi p
is a pre-policy average value-added for plant i ; Recyclingi pt ≡ 1(TIi > 0) × (1 − CITpt ); TIi
is a pre-policy average taxable corporate income for plant i ; CITpt be BC’s corporate income tax
rate; 1(TIi > 0) is an indicator function that takes one when average taxable income during the
pre-policy period is strictly positive. All specifications includes plant FE and provincial GDP as a
control. Industry by time fixed effects is included in each specification at the different aggregation-
level, 2-digit NAICS by time, 3-digit NAICS by time, and 4-digit NAICS by time, respectively. To
account for serial correlations and within sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered by
province, reported in parentheses. The last row presents the F-statistics from the joint test for the
significance of β1 and β2 together, i.e., H0: β1 = β2 = 0.∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the 10
percent level.
for a casual interpretation, especially when many other macroeconomic events happened around
the same time as the implementation of the BC carbon tax. Although some confounding factors
can be captured by the fixed effects, any factors that are different across provinces and over time
would bias the estimation. To mitigate this issue, I directly exploit plant-level variations in the
policy exposures in Eq.(4.1). This also provides me more variations to clearly identify the effects.
The results based on Eq.(6.1) are reported in the first three columns of Table 2. These robust
point estimates suggest that, on average (at $20 carbon tax), the carbon tax decreases productivity
annually by 6% during the sample period. Although the direction of the productivity effect is
consistent with the results from estimating Eq.(4.1), the magnitude is much larger when plant
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Figure 2: Distribution of Estimated Productivity Effects
Note: This figure plots the plant-level estimated TFP effects. To maintain confidentiality in conformity with Statistics
Canada’s Statistics Acts, the plant-level TFP effects and its corresponding upper and lower bounds are ranked and then
averaged over 100 plants in the order.
Source: Author’s calculation.
heterogeneity in policy exposures is ignored. This illustrates the importance of plant heterogeneity
in estimating the productivity effect using Eq.(4.1).
Now I discuss the main results. A clear pattern emerged from these results, presented in the
last three columns of Table 2. The results provide support for the first part of the PDH – the
revenue-recycling effect positively affects productivity. Based on the coefficients from column
6 of Table 2, on average, the carbon tax effect reduced productivity annually by 1.2% while the
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revenue-recycling effect increased productivity by 0.2%, leading to a net loss in productivity by
1%.42 This finding suggests that, on average, the revenue-recycling effect alleviated the negative
effect from the carbon tax by approximately 20%. This implies that recycling the tax revenues from
the carbon tax to lower the CIT rates can improve the distortion in the capital market, positively
affecting productivity.
As the positive revenue-recycling effect was not large enough, on average, to offset the negative
carbon tax effect, the second part of the PDH was not supported. However, depending on the size
of the carbon tax expenditure intensity, some plants experienced a net gain in their productivity.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the productivity effect. At the top of the figure, there are ap-
proximately 400 plants whose positive revenue-recycling effect was larger than its negative carbon
tax effect. These plants are the ones with a relatively low carbon tax expenditure intensity. For
these plants, the second part of the PDH was supported. To sum, recycling the tax revenues can
alleviate some of the adverse effects of this policy on plants’ productivity, and may even lead to a
net productivity gain.
Another way to interpret the results is to translate these percentage changes in productivity to
the changes in output (value-added). With the plant-level estimated productivity effect, on average,
the output is reduced annually by $150,000 in response to the policy.43 Although the reduction of
the CIT rates helped plants save the output, on average, by $10,000, the carbon tax reduced output
by $160,000.44
To discuss the aggregate effect, I aggregated the plant-specific output effects. The finding
suggests that BC’s manufacturing output declined by $440 million while it would have declined by
$465 million without the CIT reduction. Thus, the CIT reduction has saved output by $25 million.
6.2. Robustness Checks
In this subsection, I probe the robustness of the estimates. Overall, I found little evidence that
undermines the results reported in Section 6.6.1.45
42As the distribution of the estimated productivity effect is left-skewed, the mean and median productivity effects
differ. In terms of median, the carbon tax effect reduced productivity by 0.6% while the revenue-recycling effect
increased productivity by 0.2%, leading to a net loss in productivity by 0.4%. To maintain the confidentiality in
conformity with Statistics Canada’s Statistics Acts, I define median as a range between the 49th and 51st percentile.
43This is calculated as taking the average of plant-level output effects. The plant-level output effect is calculated as
the difference between the counterfactual output (= Yi/(1 − (αi/100)), e.g., if the productivity effect is -0.2% with
$1 million observed output, the counterfactual output is $1.002 million.) and the observed output. As the distribution
of plant-level output is heavily right-skewed, the median might be more informative. In terms of median, the output is
reduced by $4,300.
44In terms of median, the carbon tax effect reduced output by $5,800 while the revenue-recycling effect increased
output by $1,500. In the net, output declined by $4,300.
45A series of additional robustness checks are presented in Appendix C and Online Appendix D.D.3
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Table 3: Testing the Robustness of the Estimates
Base No Multi-plant Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CTaxi pt (β1) -7.35*** -17.26∗∗∗ -18.48∗∗∗ -12.57∗∗∗
(1.30) (1.17) (2.08) (2.02)
Recyclingi pt (β2) 0.13* 0.22** 0.23** 0.17*
(0.06) (0.088) (0.101) (0.099)
Industry × time
2-digit Y
3-digit Y
4-digit Y Y
N 237,333 224,792 224,792 224,792
R2 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.66
F-statistics 62.5 109 43.3 20.5
Notes: Treatment variables, CTaxi pt and Recyclingi pt are all defined as in Eq.(4.1). All
specifications includes plant FE, and provincial GDP as a control. To account for serial
correlations and within sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered by province,
reported in parentheses. No Multi-plant Firms means that I exclude plants that are owned by
a firm who owns multiple plants both in BC and ROC. From column 2 to 4 includes industry
by time FEs at the different level. F-statistics are for the joint test for the significance of β1
and β2 together, i.e., H0: β1 = β2 = 0.∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the
10 percent level.
Excluding Contaminated Control Plants
Identifying the productivity effects relies heavily on an assumption that the control plants are
not affected by the treatment (i.e., stable unit treatment value assumption – SUTVA).46 Violating
the SUTVA would bias my estimates. Such contaminations may happen if a firm owns multiple
plants across provinces because the firm can minimize the tax burden by shifting production away
from plants located in BC to plants located in the rest of Canada. Operational adjustments within a
firm with plants across BC and ROC are easier and would be more likely to occur than across plants
that do not share a common owner. To eliminate such adjustments in the estimation, I excluded
plants that are owned by a multi-plant firm with plants both in BC and ROC.47
46Alternative way to test the validity of the SUTVA is to perform a placebo test, treating one of the non-BC provinces
as a pseudo treatment group. I present the results in Table D.1 in Online Appendix D.D.3. Of fourteen coefficients (two
coefficients for seven provinces), the carbon tax effect for AB was statistically significant at 1 percent and negative
while the carbon tax effect for ON and NS were significant at 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, but positive.
None of the coefficients for the revenue-recycling effect were statistically significant. However, in contrast to BC, no
province had a pattern of sign and significance in line with the model.
47This does not exclude plants who are owned by a multi-plant firm with plants only in BC or ROC.
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Table 4: Productivity Effects using TFPQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFPR TFPQ TFPQ TFPQ
CTaxi pt -7.35*** -7.15** -11.77∗∗∗ -10.49∗∗∗
(1.3) (2.59) (2.71) (1.90)
Recyclingi pt 0.13* 0.24** 0.21* 0.20**
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Industry × time
2-digit Y
3-digit Y
4-digit Y Y
N 237,333 237,333 237,333 237,333
R2 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.68
F-statistics 62.5 4.26 19.89 59.37
Notes: TFPR is log of revenue-based TFP while TFPQ is log of quantity-based TFP.
CTaxi pt and Recyclingi pt are defined as Eq.(4.1). The result from the main estimation
reported in column 6 of Table 2 is reported in column 1 as TFPR. All specifications in-
cludes plant FE and provincial GDP as a control. Industry by time fixed effects is included
in each specification at the different aggregation-level, 2-digit NAICS by time, 3-digit
NAICS by time, and 4-digit NAICS by time, respectively. To account for serial corre-
lations and within sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered by province,
reported in parentheses. The last row presents the F-statistics from the joint test for the
significance of β1 and β2 together, i.e., H0: β1 = β2 = 0.∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at
the 10 percent level.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3, which should be compared to the results of base
specifications (column 6 of Table 2) presented in column 1 of Table 3. Despite the difference in
the sample, the estimates are robust across specifications, and the signs of the coefficient on both
carbon tax and revenue-recycling effects are preserved. I further explore this in Section 6.6.3 to see
whether there is a heterogeneous effect between single-plant firms (plants) and multi-plant firms.
Price Effects
One of the difficulties in conducting a productivity analysis is that output is measured in rev-
enue, not quantity. The exact problem with this is that plants may increase their price in response
to the policy. I argue that this price effect may not be a major issue in this paper because a majority
of plants in the sample are heavily traded internationally. This implies that their output prices are
determined at the world market, not set by individual plants. This is especially true for Canadian
manufacturing plants as Canada is considered as a small open economy. Nonetheless, I test this
price effect by constructing the quantity-based TFP (TFPQ) and compare that with my revenue-
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based TFP (TFPR). I explain in detail how I construct TFPQ in Online Appendix D.D.2.
The results, presented in Table 4, suggest that the productivity effect of this policy is reason-
ably similar regardless of the choice of TFP measures. The signs and sizes of both carbon tax
and revenue-recycling effects using TFPQ are similar to those of my base estimation with TFPR.
Unlike other studies that also compared the productivity effects between TFPR and TFPQ (e.g.,
Greenstone, List and Syverson (2012); Tanaka, Yin and Jefferson (2014)), the difference in the
productivity effect between TFPR and TFPQ identified in this paper is substantially small. This
confirms my prior expectation that the price effect is not a major concern in this context.
6.3. Heterogeneous Effects
The analyses to this point have focused on the average effects of the revenue-neutral carbon
tax on plant productivity. It is more realistic that the size of the productivity effects varies across
different plants. Some plants are likely to be more affected by this policy than others. These
differences might be attributed to the differences in plants’ characteristics. To investigate such
heterogeneous responses, I group plants into three dimensions. First, I allow the productivity
effect to differ across large, medium, and small plants based on the size of their output. This is
particularly important as the public worries that small plants might be disproportionately affected
by the policy due to their inability to adjust. Second, following up on the robustness check section, I
explore whether the productivity effect differs between the single-plant firms and multi-plant firms.
Third, I separately estimate the productivity effect for young and old plants. This is based on a
hypothesis that young plants are relatively more efficient and productive than old plants, allowing
them to adjust to the policy more efficiently. The results from these heterogeneous effect analyses
are reported in Table 5.
There are several interesting results worth discussing. First, the coefficient on the carbon tax
effect for small plants is statistically insignificant, but positive while that on the revenue-recycling
effect is statistically significant and positive. This suggests that small plants may be benefiting
from the revenue-recycling of this policy without incurring substantial costs from the policy. This
may increase the chance to support the PDH for these small plants. This finding could also imply
that the public concern about these small businesses may be unwarranted. On the other hand, large
plants are experiencing the statistically significant negative impact from the carbon tax effect and
positive impact from the revenue-recycling effect, resulting in the net decline in their TFP. Despite
a few of statistically insignificant coefficients, these results suggest that, on average (among each
group), large and medium plants experienced a net loss in their productivity by 0.5 percent and
3.5 percent, respectively, while small plants experienced a net gain in their productivity by 0.7
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Table 5: Effects of the BC Carbon Tax by Different Plant Characteristics
Plant size Firm structure Plant age
Large Medium Small Single-plant Multi-plant Old Young
CTaxi pt -2.35** -24.99*** 3.02 -15.57*** -0.36 -8.02*** -3.36**
(0.92) (2.52) (2.08) (1.18) (1.18) (1.37) (1.59)
Recyclingi pt 0.02 0.33** 0.23* 0.14** 0.13* 0.16** -0.005
(0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03)
N 77305 79445 54793 188755 48578 184027 53306
# of Firms 11131 11131 11131 29552 8131 29892 7209
R2 0.67 0.67 0.68
F-statistics 10.76 61.5 1.92 284 6.4 72 3.17
Notes: Plant size is determined by output. A plant is large if its output is above the 70th percentile, medium if its output is
between the 35th and 65th percentiles, and small if its output is below the 25th percentile. Under Firm structure, I compare
plants that are singly owned with plants whose parental firm owns multiple-plants. For Plant age, I compare plants that
are less than 9 year old at 2008 with plants that are older than 9 year old. The former plants are defined as young plants
while the latter plants are defined as old plants. All specifications includes plant FE, industry (4-digit NAICS) by time
FE, and provincial GDP as a control. To account for serial correlations and within sub-industry correlations, standard
errors are clustered by province, reported in parentheses. The last rows present the F-statistics from the joint test for the
significance of βs together, e.g., H0: β
j
1 = β j2 = 0 where j is the group category, e.g., large plants.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
25
percent.48
The remaining results are consistent with my prior expectations. As shown in the robustness
checks, single-plant firms are more negatively affected by the carbon tax effect than multi-plant
firms. On average, single-plant firms experienced a net loss in their productivity by 2 percent.49
What is interesting here is that multi-plant firms are not affected by the policy. These findings
suggest that it is not the small plants that are affected more negatively, but rather single-plant firms.
Given that a majority of small plants are often singly-owned, the negative productivity effect on
the single-plant firms is expected to be driven by the medium single-plant firms.
Similarly as expected, old-plants are more (negatively) affected by the policy than young plants.
On average, old plants experienced a net loss in their productivity by 1.2 percent while young
plants experienced a net loss by 0.5 percent.50 This finding may imply that there are more rooms
for productivity improvements of old plants if the policy is designed to encourage them to invest
and modernize their production technology. A surprising finding here is that young plants are not
responding (i.e., almost zero effect) to the revenue-recycling. This could imply that young plants
are likely to be at the optimal (efficient) point in their investment decision, allowing them not to
respond to the reduction of the CIT rates.
6.4. Dynamic Effects
All the specifications above assume that plants respond to the policy contemporaneously. While
this may be true, it is also likely that some adjustments, such as investments, may take some time
and their impact on productivity may be pronounced later. This may be, especially, true for the
market-based policy, such as a carbon tax, because it provides incentives for plants to respond.
It may take some time for plants to best respond to such incentives, hence affecting productivity
with lags. I explore the possibility of such long-term responses by adding one and two years of
the lagged carbon tax and revenue-recycling effects in Eq.(4.1). One cautionary note here is that
I would argue that what I discuss here is suggestive for the long-term responses because the time
span used in this paper is too short to be considered long-run.
The results are presented in Table 6. Column 1 is taken from column 6 of Table 2, which
should be used as a baseline for comparisons. One of the most interesting findings here is that
there is a positive lag carbon tax effect. When the one-year lag of carbon tax effect and that of
revenue-recycling effect are included, the contemporaneous carbon tax effect became more nega-
48In terms of median, large and medium plants experienced a net loss in their productivity by 0.15 percent and 1.5
percent, respectively, while small plants experienced a net gain in their productivity by 0.5 percent.
49In terms of median, the net loss is 0.9 percent. The results suggest that the carbon tax effect and revenue-recycling
effect canceled each other out, resulting in almost zero effect on their productivity.
50In terms of median, old plants experienced the net loss by 0.4 percent while young plants experienced the net loss
by 0.2 percent.
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Table 6: Dynamic Effects – Allowing for Lags
(1) (2) (3)
CTaxi pt -7.4*** -12.9∗∗∗ -7.2∗∗
(1.3) (2.5) (2.4)
CTaxi pt−1 9.1∗∗∗ 2.4
(1.96) (1.94)
CTaxi pt−2 3.13*
(1.7)
Recyclingi pt 0.13* 0.12* 0.14***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Recyclingi pt−1 0.02 0.06
(0.07) (0.14)
Recyclingi pt−2 -0.12*
(0.06)
N 237333 197752 163658
R2 0.67 0.7 0.73
F-statistics (All) 62.5 28.4 133
Notes: Treatment variables, CTaxi pt , and Recyclingi pt are defined as Eq.(4.1).
All specifications includes plant FE, industry (4-digit NAICS) by time FE, and
provincial GDP as a control. To account for serial correlations and within
sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered by province, reported
in parentheses. The last row presents the F-statistics from the joint test for the
significance of β1 and β2 together, i.e., H0: β1 = β2 = 0.∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗
Significant at the 10 percent level.
tive than the estimate without the lag. The one-year lag carbon tax effect is statistically significant
and positive. The contemporaneous and one-year lag revenue-recycling effects are both positive;
however, only the contemporaneous effect is statistically significant. Including both one and two
years of lag generates similar results as the one-year lag estimates except now two-year lag effects
are statistically significant. These findings suggest that this may be evidence for both the PDH and
Porter hypothesis in the long-run.51
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Figure 3: Comparison of the Distributions of Productivity Effects
Note: This figure plots the plant-level estimated TFP effects (baseline) and counterfactual TFP effects. To maintain
confidentiality in conformity with Statistics Canada’s Statistics Acts, the plant-level TFP effects and its counterfactuals
are ranked and then averaged over 100 plants in the order.
Source: Author’s calculation.
7. Discussion
All the analyses above have shown that recycling the carbon tax revenue by reducing the rates
of corporate income tax positively affects productivity. However, at the current rates, the average
51The Porter hypothesis is about strict environmental regulations encouraging investment and innovation, thus pos-
itively affecting productivity. This paper suggests that the Porter hypothesis may be more realistic for the long-run as
only the lagged carbon tax effects are positive, not the contemporaneous effect.
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net productivity effect was negative. During the 2008-2012 period, on average 50% of the tax
revenue was recycled back to the economy through the reduction of the CIT. The other half was re-
cycled through the reduction of the personal income tax and the lump-sum transfer to low-income
households. Instead of recycling the tax revenues this way, one can recycle the revenues entirely
through the reduction of the CIT. This may increase the size of the positive revenue-recycling
effect, increasing the chance of supporting the PDH. To explore this possibility, I take the esti-
mates from column 6 of Table 2 and then increase the reduction rates of the CIT.52 The results are
presented in Figure 3.
As expected, the distribution of productivity effects slightly shifts to the right, expanding the
positive region. The number of plants who experienced the net gain in their productivity is ap-
proximately tripled from the baseline. Yet, the average net productivity effect is negative (-0.8%).
One interesting finding from this counterfactual experiment is that when the carbon tax rate is at
$10/t CO2e, the median net productivity effect is positive (on the order of 0.06%). These findings
emphasize that the economic impacts of a policy depend heavily on how the revenues are returned
to the economy because it is possible to design a policy that supports the productivity dividend
hypothesis.
8. Conclusion
Theoretical research hypothesizes that environmental taxes can achieve both emission reduc-
tions and welfare (employment) gains. The non-environmental benefits of such policies come from
recycling tax revenues to reduce rates of distortionary taxes. This paper developed a new hypoth-
esis – the “Productivity Dividend Hypothesis” – and empirically showed that recycling revenues
has a potential to improve productivity.
The model I present in this paper suggests that taxing energy purchases diverts productive
resources away from production, reducing productivity. On the other hand, reducing corporate
income tax rates encourages productivity-enhancing investments. If the latter is larger than the
former, the carbon tax can generate a net gain in productivity.
Using a unique micro-level data on manufacturing activities and corporate income tax, I find
that the BC carbon tax had a negative carbon tax effect and positive revenue-recycling effect on
52To do this, I made a few assumptions. First, I assume that the total carbon tax revenue raised does not change
between the actual reduction rates and the counterfactual reduction rates of the CIT. Second, the amount of corporate
taxable income does not change between the actual and counterfactual. With these two assumptions, I calculated the
counterfactual reduction rates of the CIT. I do this by taking the ratio between the level of the total carbon tax revenue
recycled and the level of the revenue recycled via the reduction of the CIT rates. Then I multiply the ratio to the actual
reduction rates of the CIT to obtain the counterfactual reduction rates. I set the counterfactual reduction rates to be
as follows: 3.3 percentage point reduction in 2008, 3.5 percentage point reduction in 2010, and 4.4 percentage point
reduction in 2011.
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plants’ productivity. However, the net effect of this policy was negative. On average, the carbon
tax effect reduced productivity annually by 1.2% while the revenue-recycling effect increased pro-
ductivity by 0.2%, leading to a net loss in productivity by 1%. In the aggregate, the declines in
productivity by the carbon tax correspond to output reductions by $465 million while the CIT re-
duction saves output by $25 million, resulting in a net loss by $440 million. These findings suggest
that recycling tax revenues alleviates some of the adverse effects of the policy on plants’ productiv-
ity, but not all. Given that the complete offset is not the exact intention of the revenue-recycling, it
is expected to see some plants’ productivity falling while others experience productivity enhance-
ment.
How are these negative productivity effects compared to the benefits of the policy? Aggregate
emission from the manufacturing sector in BC has declined by 4% relative to the manufacturing
sector in the rest of Canada after the implementation of the policy.53 The reduction of productivity
by 1% seems reasonably small.54 Thus, the public concern regarding emission reductions being
achieved at the cost of economic growth may be unwarranted.
One caveat of this paper is that the negative productivity effect I identified in this paper is
mainly a short-term response. As I pointed out in my simple model, investing in abatement
(energy-saving activities) plays an important role in generating a positive effect on productivity.
However, the potential efficiency improvements from this investment may not be immediately re-
flected in one’s productivity. It is possible that plants suffer from carbon tax in the short-run while
managing to become more efficient and productive than before the implementation of the policy
in the long-run. The results presented in Section 6.6.4 supports this claim although more data is
required to fully analyze the long-term effect.
Finally, I conclude this paper by emphasizing the importance of the revenue-neutrality of car-
bon tax policy. This paper, for the first time, provided evidence that recycling revenues through
the reduction of corporate income taxes can alleviate the adverse effects of the policy, possibly
leading to productivity enhancement. The empirical exercise conducted in this paper to evaluate
the “Productivity Dividend Hypothesis” can be tested more broadly for any environmental taxes
that attempt to keep the policy revenue-neutral by the tax substitutions. Furthermore, an empirical
investigation of the “Productivity Double Dividend Hypothesis” of environmental taxes would also
bring fruitful contributions to both the literature and public policy.
53This is calculated by using the facility-level emission data from Environment and Climate Change
Canada. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/greenhouse-gas-emissions/
facility-reporting/data.html
54This is not to say that this reduction of emission is solely due to the policy.
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Appendices
Appendix A Model
Here I present a more general treatment of the model shown in the text by assuming that only
a portion λA > 0 of the abatement investment cost is deductible. In the text, I assume that λA = 1.
With λA, the profit function is expressed as follows:
pi = B(1− σ)σ−1σ−σ (1− tc)−σ cx1−σ − (1− λAtc)IA (A.1)
Solving the profit maximization problem yields:
IA = 0
1
γ A
σ−1
γ τ
− α(σ−1)γ (1− λk tc)−
β(1−α)(σ−1)
γ (1− tc) 1+β(1−α)(σ−1)γ (1− λAtc)
−1
γ (A.2)
Abatement investment function
Here I show that Eq.(A.2) is a decreasing function of carbon tax and a decreasing function of
corporate income tax in more detail.
To show that Eq.(A.2) is a decreasing function of carbon tax, I take the second derivative of the
profit function (Eq.(A.1)):
pi ′′ = B(1− σ)σ−1σ−σ (1− tc)(καA−1cF1−α τ˜α)σ−1(αρ(σ − 1))(−γ )I−(γ+1)A (A.3)
In order for the second order condition of the profit maximization to be satisfied, i.e., pi ′′ < 0, it
must be that γ > 0.
Then, notice here that the existence of λA does not alter how the carbon tax affects the abate-
ment investment function, i.e., the effect of the carbon tax on the abatement investment is still
ambiguous as:
IA = 8 0
1
γ τ
− α(σ−1)γ (A.4)
where 8 is the rest of non-carbon tax variables and parameters in Eq.(A.2).
Next, showing that Eq.(A.2) is a decreasing function of the CIT rate is a bit more involved as tc
shows up in multiple places. Given that λA ∈ [0, 1], I consider the two extreme cases, 1) λA = 0,
and 2) λA = 1.
When λA = 0,
IA = 0
1
γ A
σ−1
γ τ
− α(σ−1)γ (1+METR)− β(1−α)(σ−1)γ (1− tc) (A.5)
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where 1+METR = 1−λk tc1−tc , and METR is the marginal effective tax rate.1 Eq.(A.5) is a decreasing
function of the CIT as long as the METR is an increasing function of the CIT, which is true when
λk < 1.2
When λA = 1,
IA = 0
1
γ A
σ−1
γ τ
− α(σ−1)γ (1+METR)− β(1−α)(σ−1)γ (A.6)
Similarly, Eq.(A.6) is a decreasing function of the CIT as long as the METR is an increasing
function of the CIT.
As I show that the abatement investment is a decreasing function of the CIT in both cases, the
abatement investment is a decreasing function of the CIT regardless of the value of λA as long as
λk < 1.
TFP function
Plugging Eq.(A.2) into Eq.(3.12) yields:
TFP = A1/γ 0˜τ −αγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Carbon tax
(
1− tc
1− λAtc
) αρ
γ
(
1− λk tc
1− tc
)− αβ(ρ(σ−1)−1)γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue-recycling
(A.7)
Here I show that the sign of carbon tax and revenue-recycling effects in Eq.(A.7).
Carbon tax effect
Similar to the abatement investment function, the sign of the carbon tax effect is ambiguous
due to the presence of 0˜ in Eq.(A.7).
Revenue-recycling effect
To determine the sign of the revenue-recycling effect, I consider the two extreme cases as
before, , 1) λA = 0, and 2) λA = 1.
When λA = 0,
TFP = A1/γ 0˜τ −αγ (1+METR) αβ(1−ρ(σ−1))γ (1− tc)αρ (A.8)
Eq.(A.8) is a decreasing function of the CIT if 1 ≤ ρ(σ − 1). If 1 > ρ(σ − 1), Eq.(A.8) can still
be a decreasing function of the CIT when the speed of the decrease of (1− tc)αρ is larger than the
speed of the increase of (1+METR) αβ(1−ρ(σ−1))γ with the CIT.
1See Mckenzie (2016) for a more detail explanation of the METR.
2λk > 1 means capital is subsidized.
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When λA = 1,
TFP = A1/γ 0˜τ −αγ (1+METR) αβ(1−ρ(σ−1))γ (A.9)
Similarly, Eq.(A.9) is a decreasing function of the CIT if 1 ≤ ρ(σ − 1).
In both cases, TFP is a decreasing function of the CIT if 1 ≤ ρ(σ − 1). This means that the
reduction of the CIT will likely to have a positive impact on TFP when the abatement technology
improves faster with the abatement investment, and the goods are more substitutable.
Appendix B Data
B.1 The ASM-GIFI linkage
Here I describe the detail of the linkage of two micro-data. The plant-level data used in this
paper is created by merging two existing data at Statistics Canada: the Annual Survey of Man-
ufactures (ASM) and General Index of Financial Information (GIFI). The linkage is required for
estimating the production function because capital data is missing from the ASM. One issue for
this linkage is that the ASM is the plant-level data while the GIFI is the firm-level data. There are
three steps involved in the ASM-GIFI linkage.
First, the firm identifier is used to merge two data. One of the advantages of the ASM is that
it has information about the ownership of plants. Not only does this information allow me to
distinguish between singly-owned plants and multi-plant firms, but also it enables the match of
firms between these two data. The data is merged at the firm-level. Next two steps disaggregate
this firm-level data from the GIFI to the plant-level.
Next step is to determine what percentage of the firm’s business activities comes from the
manufacturing. This is important as some firms may be involved in various activities including
non-manufacturing. I calculated the share of revenues coming strictly from manufacturing. I
divided the manufacturing revenues by the total revenues. I use this share to split the firm’s capital
into manufacturing and non-manufacturing capitals.
The last step is to allocate the firm’s manufacturing capital to its plants.3 To do this, I calculated
the share of revenues for each plant relative to manufacturing revenues of its parent firm. I used
this share to allocate the firm-level capital down to each plant within the firm.
B.2 Similarity of tax-paying and in-loss plants in BC
In this appendix, I explore a concern that tax-paying and in-loss plants may operate differently.
I do this in two ways. First, I compare plant characteristics between these two groups. Second, I
3This step is irrelevant for singly-owned firms as there is only one plant for these firms.
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Table B.1: Comparison of Plant Characteristics Between Tax-paying and In-loss Plants
In-loss Tax-paying Difference Standardized
Difference
Output 14.25 14.71 -0.465***
(1.749) (1.542) (0.0313) 0.282
Value-added 13.49 14.01 -0.520***
(1.731) (1.487) (0.0308) 0.322
Labor 2.461 2.691 -0.229***
(1.322) (1.277) (0.0242) 0.176
Capital 9.609 12.42 -2.810***
(7.638) (3.817) (0.127) 0.465
Intermediate 13.53 13.94 -0.413***
(1.926) (1.731) (0.0346) 0.226
Material 13.46 13.88 -0.415***
(1.935) (1.785) (0.0350) 0.223
Energy 10.12 10.48 -0.356***
(2.632) (2.315) (0.0471) 0.144
Energy intensity 0.0362 0.0285 0.00773**
(0.145) (0.0863) (0.00244) -0.065
Fuel 9.084 9.479 -0.395***
(3.441) (3.249) (0.0625) 0.118
# of plants per firm 1.459 3.346 -1.887***
(2.377) (12.82) (0.125) 0.205
Age 5.194 5.731 -0.536***
(2.122) (1.852) (0.0379) 0.269
Int’l export share 0.247 0.227 0.0198**
(0.339) (0.320) (0.00616) -0.060
Inter-provincial export share 0.117 0.135 -0.0181***
(0.199) (0.219) (0.00376) 0.086
Total export share 0.364 0.362 0.00172
(0.390) (0.381) (0.00715) -0.004
Share of exporting plants 0.632 0.677 -0.0447***
(0.482) (0.468) (0.00882) 0.094
Share of plants with R&D 0.709 0.673 0.0357***
(0.454) (0.469) (0.00844) -0.077
Notes: This table presents the pre-policy mean of various plant characteristics for in-loss and
tax-paying plants in British Columbia. T -tests are performed to exam whether the pre-policy
mean differences are different from zero between these two groups. Standardized differences
are calculated as Y treated−Y control√
(s2treated+s2control)/2
, and correct the t-statistics of the t-test for the sample size.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the
10 percent level.
check to see whether the pre-policy productivity trends for these two groups are parallel.
The first important fact about in-loss plants in the data is that they are, in fact, operating. Ta-
ble B.B.2 shows that the mean differences of these important plant characteristics are statistically
different from zero between these groups using the t-tests. However, most of the standardized dif-
ferences of these variables are not larger than 0.25. These suggest that in-loss plants are operating
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Figure B.1: Trends of TFP
Note: This figure plots the trends of TFP for tax-paying plants and in-loss plants in BC.
Source: Author’s calculation.
in a similar fashion so that they are a good candidate to be treated as counterfactual for tax-paying
plants to identify the revenue-recycling effect of the policy.
Furthermore, to credibly identify the revenue-recycling effect of the policy, the pre-policy pro-
ductivity trends should be parallel between tax-paying and in-loss plants in BC. Figure B.1 shows
the trends of productivity for tax-paying and in-loss plants in BC are reasonably parallel during the
pre-policy period. This further justifies the use of in-loss plants as a control group.
B.3 Balancing with the propensity score weights
Here I discuss the use of the propensity scores in the estimation. One advantage of the data
used in this paper is the detailed coverage of the plants’ information. To take advantage of this
rich data, I augment the conventional difference-in-differences estimator with weights based on
propensity scores. More weights are given to control plants that resemble treated plants. This
method re-weights the distribution of control plants based on the propensity scores, which allows
me to compare similar treated and control plants. Table B.2 lists a full set of variables used for
estimating the propensity scores.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the propensity score re-weighting, I show how similar plants in
BC and plants in ROC are in terms of their plant characteristics. Table B.3 shows the difference in
means for various plant characteristics between BC and ROC plants from the pre-policy period. I
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Table B.2: A full set of variables used for estimating the propensity scores
TFP Taxable income
Output Labor
Capital Intermediates
Production workers International export
Non-production workers Intra-provincial export
R&D Wage for production worker
Wage Salaries for non-production worker
Utility bill Electricity
International export intensity Gasoline
Intra-provincial export intensity Diesel fuel
4 digit NAICS ID Natural gas
Plant age Coal
Total expenditure Light fuel oil
Revenue Heavy fuel oil
Profits Liquefied petroleum gases
# of subsidiary Others energy
Note: All energy related variables are in expenditures, not in quantities.
use the standardized differences to examine whether the differences are statistically different from
zero.
A clear pattern emerged from this comparison. The mean differences of plant characteristics
between BC and ROC plants shrink substantially when using the weights. Comparing the size of
the standardized differences also reinforces this as they also become smaller and far less than 0.25.
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Table B.3: Comparing plant characteristics between BC and ROC plants with and without the
weights
Unweighted Weighted
Difference Standardized
Difference
Difference Standardized
Difference
Output -0.420 -0.262 -0.097 -0.059
Value-added -0.365 -0.232 -0.076 -0.047
Labor -0.328 -0.246 -0.076 -0.057
Capital -0.382 -0.073 -0.117 -0.022
Intermediate -0.470 -0.263 -0.106 -0.058
Material -0.468 -0.256 -0.104 -0.055
Energy -0.541 -0.231 -0.137 -0.057
Energy intensity -0.007 -0.041 -0.006 -0.036
Fuel -0.432 -0.132 -0.076 -0.023
# of plants per firm -0.966 -0.075 -0.395 -0.033
Age -0.066 -0.035 -0.029 -0.015
Int’l export share 0.017 0.054 0.011 0.034
Inter-provincial export share -0.024 -0.106 -0.011 -0.048
Total export share -0.007 -0.018 0.000 0.001
Share of exporting plants -0.038 -0.083 -0.008 -0.018
Share of plants with R&D 0.021 0.044 0.008 0.018
Note: This table shows the difference in means of plant characteristics between BC and ROC plants
from the pre-policy period (2004-2007). Unweighted indicates that the propensity scores (PS) were
not used to calculate the mean differences while Weighted indicates that the PS were used. Stan-
dardized differences (SD) are calculated as Y treated−Y control√
(s2treated+s2control)/2
, and correct the t-statistics of the t-test
for the sample size. SD being larger than 0.25 means that the difference is statistically different from
zero.
Appendix C Additional Results
In this appendix, I present additional results discussed in the main texts.
C.1 Testing the pre-treatment effects
To strengthen the credibility of the identification of the treatment effects, I examine whether the
carbon tax and revenue-recycling effects are statistically significant during the pre-policy period.
This is often referred to as a placebo test, treating the pre-policy period to be treated. I present
the result of the two specifications in Table C.1. In column 1, I estimate Eq.(4.1) using the data
only from the pre-policy period (2004-2007). In column 2, I interact both carbon tax and revenue-
recycling effects with year dummies. In both cases, the results show that the carbon tax and
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Table C.1: Testing the Pre-treatment Effects
(1) (2)
CTaxi pt 0.246
(0.228)
× year2004 0.278
(0.226)
× year2005 0.256
(0.223)
× year2006 0.203
(0.223)
× year2007 0.204
(0.222)
Recyclingi pt 0.0182
(0.0332)
× year2004 0.0267
(0.0424)
× year2005 0.0239
(0.0387)
× year2006 0.0902**
(0.0359)
× year2007 0.0920**
(0.0361)
N 120433 120433
R2 0.740 0.725
Notes: These estimates only use data from the pre-policy period (2004-2007). Treatment vari-
ables, CTaxi pt and Recyclingi pt , are defined as in Eq.(4.1). Column (2) interacts treatment vari-
ables with year dummies. Both specifications include plant FE and provincial GDP as a control.
Column (1) also includes industry (4-digit NAICS) by year FE. To account for serial correlations
and within sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered by province, reported in paren-
theses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at
the 10 percent level.
revenue-recycling effects are not statistically significant.
C.2 Robustness of revenue-recycling effect
In Eq.(4.1), the revenue-recycling effect is defined as 1(TIi > 0)× (1−CITpt) where 1(TIi >
0) is an indicator function that takes one when average taxable corporate income during the pre-
policy period is strictly positive, and (1−CITpt) is the net of BC’s corporate income tax rate. Here
I test the robustness of the estimates using different thresholds for the taxable income indicator
function.
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Table C.2: Checking Robustness of Revenue-recycling effect
(1) (2) (3)
CTaxi pt -7.35∗∗∗ -7.35∗∗∗ -7.35∗∗∗
(1.30) (1.299) (1.298)
Recyclingi pt (TIi > 0) 0.13∗
(0.07)
Recyclingi pt (TIi > $230) 0.131∗∗
(0.062)
Recyclingi pt (TIi > $1, 679) 0.133∗∗
(0.062)
N 237,333 237,333 237,333
R2 0.67 0.67 0.67
Notes: Dependent variable and CTaxi pt are defined as Eq.(4.1). The definition of
Recyclingi pt is altered, and its result is presented in each column. Column 1 is taken from
column 6 of Table 2. In column 2, I changed the threshold for Recyclingi pt from zero to
approximately $230, which is the 1st percentile of plants whose taxable income is positive.
I further change the threshold of Recyclingi pt in column 3 to $1,679 (5th percentile). All
specifications includes plant FE, industry (4-digit NAICS) by time FE, and provincial GDP
as a control. To account for serial correlations and within sub-industry correlations, standard
errors are clustered by province, reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the
10 percent level.
Table C.2 presents the results of two specifications along with the base result, which is taken
from column 6 of Table 2. In column 2 of Table C.2, I changed the threshold to be less than
5th percentile of taxable income ($230) among plants with average positive income during the
pre-policy period. In column 3, I changed the threshold to be less than 10th percentile ($1,679).
Regardless of the different thresholds, I find robust evidence that the revenue-recycling effect of
the carbon tax is statistically significant and positive.
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Appendix D For Online Publication
D.1 Construction of Total Factor Productivity
In this appendix, I describe the details of the data and method used for the construction of the
total factor productivity and its method. First, I explain the data below.
To estimate plant-level total factor productivity, two confidential micro-level data are merged,
the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and General Index of Financial Information (GIFI).
The ASM is an annual survey that contains information on manufacturing activities for all man-
ufacturing locations in Canada. The GIFI is an extensive list of financial statement items, which
businesses use to file their T2 corporate income tax return.
Annual Survey of Manufactures
Output (Yi t): Plant output is total value of shipments of manufacturing goods minus raw material
expenditure. It is deflated to 2007 dollars using industry-specific price indexes from the Canadian
Productivity Accounts.
Labor (L i t): I use the number of total employees, which are the sum of production workers and
non-production workers.
Energy (Ei t): Energy is total of energy expenditures.
General Index of Financial Information
Capital (Ki t): Capital is the book values of tangible assets, deflated to 2007 dollars using industry-
specific price indexes from the Canadian Productivity Accounts.
Total Factor Productivity: Plant-level TFP is the log residual from a semiparametric production
function estimation. I explain the details of the method below.4
Consider a plant with a Cobb-Douglas value-added production function:5
Yi t = Ai tLβli t K βki t Eβei t (D.1)
Taking logs yields:
yi t = β0 + βlli t + βkki t + βeei t + i t (D.2)
4Although I explain each step of the modified ACF method one by one here, I used the user-written package,
prodest, available in stata to implement these procedures. I am grateful for the creators of the package, Gabriele
Rovigatti and Vincenzo Mollisi, for their help in modifying the ACF method using their package.
5I implicitly assume that a gross output production function is Leontief in the raw materials, i.e., GO =
G(F(K , L , E),M).
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where lowercase symbols represent the logs of variables and ln(Ai t) = β0 + i t . To estimate
the production function using the algorithm introduced by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) –
henceforth ACF method, i t is separated into two components, ωi t and ηi t .
yi t = β0 + βlli t + βkki t + βeei t + ωi t + ηi t (D.3)
where ωi t is the unobserved productivity and ηi t is the idiosyncratic error term. This method
assumes each input is determined at a different time. Capital is determined at t−1 while labor and
energy are determined at t − b where b ∈ (0, 1). These differences in decision timing are what
make the identification of the input coefficients possible. Now raw material input (Mi t ) is used as
a proxy to express the unobserved productivity with observables. Unlike the rest of variables, raw
material is determined at t . Assume that:
mi t = mi t(ωi t , li t , ki t , ei t , zit) (D.4)
While the original ACF method assumes that mi t depends only on the unobserved productivity,
capital, and labor, this formulation is problematic when the objective is to estimate the produc-
tivity effect of environmental regulations. This is because there could be a selection bias arising
from only productive plants engaging in the energy-saving activities. There could also be another
simultaneity bias because the energy-saving decisions depends on a prior expectation of its own
productivity. To address this issue, the vector of the determinants of productivity, zit, is included
in mi t . Following De Loecker (2013) and Lutz (2016), zit consists of export status, R&D status,
energy intensity, and carbon tax dummy.
By assuming that mi t is strictly positive and monotonic in ωi t , mi t can be inverted to express
the unobserved productivity as a function of observables:
ωi t = ht(li t , ki t , ei t ,mi t , zit) (D.5)
Then, substituting Eq.(D.5) into Eq.(D.3) yields:
yi t = β0 + βlli t + βkki t + βeei t + ht(li t , ki t , ei t ,mi t , zit)+ ηi t (D.6)
The first stage of ACF method involves estimating Eq.(D.6) using a semi-parametric method, treat-
ing ht(li t , ki t , ei t ,mi t , zit) non-parametrically. A (4th-order) polynomial function, φt(.), in all its
variables is often imposed as:
yi t = φt(li t , ki t , ei t ,mi t , zit)+ ηi t (D.7)
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Although estimating Eq.(D.7) does not identify any input coefficients, it is still important as it nets
out ηi t and yields φ̂t , which is used in the second stage.
Here I assume that the unobserved productivity follows the first-order Markov process:
ωi t = E[ωi t |Jit−1]+ ξi t (D.8)
= E[ωi t |ωi t−1, zit−1]+ ξi t (D.9)
= g(ωi t−1, zit−1)+ ξi t (D.10)
where Jit−1 is the information set at time t − 1. From the first stage, I have:
ω̂i t−1 = φ̂i t−1 − βlli t−1 − βkki t−1 − βeei t−1 (D.11)
Substituting Eq.(D.10) and Eq.(D.11) into Eq.(D.3) yields:
yi t = β0 +βlli t + βkki t + βeei t
+ g′(φ̂i t−1 − βlli t−1 − βkki t−1 − βeei t−1, zit−1)+ ξi t + ηi t (D.12)
Then three moment conditions are used to identify βl, βk, and βe.
E(ξi t + ηi t , ki t) = 0 (D.13)
E(ξi t + ηi t , li t−1) = 0 (D.14)
E(ξi t + ηi t , ei t−1) = 0 (D.15)
Finally, with the unbiased and consistent estimate of all input coefficients, β̂l, β̂k, β̂e, plant-level
TFP is calculated as a residual:
tfp = yi t − β̂0 − β̂lli t − β̂kki t − β̂eei t (D.16)
I estimate Eq.(D.16) for each of 21 sub-sectors (at 3-digit NAICS) within manufacturing in-
dustry separately.
D.2 Constructing the quantity-based TFP (TFPQ)
In this appendix, I summarize how I construct the quantity-based TFP (TFPQ) using the ap-
proach proposed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). This approach derives an expression for TFPQ
from the revenue-based TFP (TFPR) without needing to obtain the plant-specific output prices.
The basic model is based on a standard model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous
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plants. Single final good Y is produced by a representative firm in a perfect competitive final output
market with Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Y =
S∏
s=1
Y θss ,
S∑
s=1
θs = 1 (D.17)
The final good producer maximizes:
max
Ys
PY −
S∑
s=1
PsYs = P
S∏
s=1
Y θss −
S∑
s=1
PsYs (D.18)
and the first-order condition (FOC) is:
θs
Ys
P
S∏
s=1
Y θss = Ps ⇒ PsYs = θsPY (D.19)
Industry output Ys is itself a CES aggregate of Ms differentiated products:
Ys =
[∑
Ms
Y
σ−1
σ
si
] σ
σ−1
(D.20)
The demand for these industries is given by maximizing:
max
Ysi
PsYs −
∑
Ms
PsiYsi = Ps
[∑
Ms
Y
σ−1
σ
si
] σ
σ−1 −
∑
Ms
PsiYsi (D.21)
and the FOC is:
Psi = σ
σ − 1 Ps
[∑
Ms
Y
σ−1
σ
si
] 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
Y
−1
σ
si (D.22)
= PsY
1
σ
s Y
−1
σ
si (D.23)
Then, multiple both sides by Ysi yields:
PsiYsi = PsY
1
σ
s Y
σ−1
σ
si (D.24)
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Then, raise both sides by σ/(σ − 1) yields:
Ysi =
(
PsY
1
σ
s
) −σ
σ−1
(PsiYsi )
σ
σ−1 (D.25)
Finally, Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) defines TFPQ as:
T FPQsi ≡ Asi = Ysi
K αssi L
1−αsi
si
(D.26)
Although we do not have neither Psi nor Ysi directly from the data, using (D.25) (i.e., expressing
Ysi as a function of PsiYsi ) helps me derive the following:
Asi = κs (PsiYsi )
σ
σ−1
K αssi L
1−αsi
si
(D.27)
where κs = (PsYs)− 1σ−1 /Ps . Then,
ln Asi = ln κs + σ
σ − 1 ln PsiYsi − αsksi − (1− αs)lsi (D.28)
This equation requires only an assumption about the elasticity of substitution between plant
value-added, σ . It requires neither the plant-level output price nor the plant-level output. Fol-
lowing Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I set σ = 3 as estimates of the substitutability of competing
manufacturers in the trade and industrial organization literature typically range from 3 to 10. In
estimating TFPQ, I ignore the industry-common term, κ , because this does not vary across plants
within the same sub-industry, which would be captured by the fixed effects. Given that I estimate
TFPQ for each sub-industry separately, this term does not affect the plant-level TFPQ within the
same sub-industry. With σ = 3, estimating TFPQ is as simple as scaling down the revenue-based
value-added by 2/3 and re-run the Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer algorithm.
D.3 Additional Results
D.3.1 Additional Robustness Check by Placebo Tests
In Appendix C.C.1, I performed a placebo test using the data only from the pre-policy period.
Alternatively, one can also perform a placebo test using control groups to be treated. This allows
me to test whether the policy also affected other provinces, often called contamination or spillover
effect. If so, this violates an important assumption called the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) required for identification. Here I test the validity of the SUTVA.
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Table D.1: Placebo Tests by Implementing Fake Carbon Tax in Other Provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AB NS NB QC ON MB SK
CTax -0.0507*** 12.22* -1.204 2.629 1.479** 6.703 3.069
(0.0107) (6.227) (2.305) (2.085) (0.632) (7.327) (2.663)
Recycling -0.00427 0.249 0.121 0.0332 0.0694 0.181 0.110
(0.137) (0.227) (0.107) (0.0436) (0.0528) (0.114) (0.143)
N 206,760 206,765 206,774 206,772 206,775 206,766 206,775
R2 0.678 0.702 0.687 0.689 0.927 0.678 0.672
Notes: Provincial abbreviation is as follows: Alberta (AB), Nova Scotia (NS), New Brunswick
(NB), Que´bec (QC), Ontario (ON), Manitoba (MB), and Saskatchewan(SK). All specifications
includes plant FE, industry (3-digit NAICS) by time FE, and provincial GDP as a control. To
account for serial correlations and within sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered
by 3-digit NAICS industry × province, reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10
percent level.
Similar to performing the placebo test only using the pre-policy period, I impose a “placebo”
carbon tax and “placebo” revenue-recycling effects on other provinces. If there are no spillover
effects, these “placebo” effects should not have any productivity effects.6
The results are reported in Table D.1. Each column reports the results of estimation for each
province. First finding worth noting is that there is no province with both carbon tax and revenue-
recycling effects statistically significant. The carbon tax effect is statistically significant for Al-
berta, Nova Scotia, and Ontario although the signs are reversed for Nova Scotia and Ontario. The
revenue-recycling effect is not statistically significant for all provinces. These results suggest that
the identification in the main text is not biased by the spillover effects, which validates the SUTVA
in this content.
6This version of a placebo test is conducted using multiple control groups (non-BC provinces), and treating one of
them as a pseudo treatment group. See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for more details.
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